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Criminal Procedure

magistrate having jurisdiction over the property. 11 A seizure without
process may be made, however, if the seizure is incident to an arrest 12
or the law enforcement agency has probable cause to believe that the
property was used in a manner that would cause the property to be
subject to forfeiture. 13 Forfeiture proceedings for property seized without process must begin promptly, and take precedence over other
proceedings. 14
Furthermore, under Chapter 449 the seizing agency may place the
property under seal, 15 remove it to a designated storage place, 16 or remove it for disposal if authorized by statute. 17 Upon a decision by the
court that the seized property is forfeited, the seizing agency may retain
the property for official use, 18 sell property that is not required to be
destroyed by law, 19 or remove the property for disposition. 20
I I. /d. c. 449, §3(1), at 1135.
12. /d. c. 449 §3(2)(a), at 1135.
13. /d. c. 449, §3(2)(b), at 1135; see also One 1970 Chevrolet v. Nye County, 90 Nev. 31, 34,
518 P.2d 38, 40 (1974) (application of similar provisions to controlled substances).
14. 1983 Nev. Stat. c. 449, §3(3), at 1135. Once the property is seized, it is in the custody of
the law enforcement agency, subject only to the court having jurisdiction over the property. If the
seizing agericy does not file a complaint for forfeiture within sixty days from the time of seizure,
the property will be subject to an action to claim delivery. Jd
I 5. /d. c. 449, §3(4)(a), at 1136.
16. /d. c. 449, §3(4)(b), at 1136.
17. /d. c. 449, §3(4)(c), at 1136.
18. ld. c. 449, §3(5)(a), at 1136.
19. /d. c. 449, §3(5)(b), at 1136.
20. /d. c. 449, §3(5)(c), at 1136.

Criminal Procedure; interception of inmate telephone calls
NEv. REV. STAT. §§209.- (new); §200.620 (amended).
SB 117 (Committee on Judiciary); 1983 STAT. Ch 287
Existing law prohibits the interception 1 of wire communications2 unless ( 1) the interception is made with the consent of the parties to the
communication, 3 (2) a court order is obtained, 4 or (3) exigent circumstances exist and it is impractical to obtain a court order before the
interception. 5 In addition, existing law does not apply to a business proI. NEV. REv. STAT. §179.430 (definition of intercept).
2. /d. §§179.455, 200.610(2) (definition of wire communication).
3. /d. §200.620(1)(a).
4. /d. §§179.410.515.
5. /d. §200.620(l){b). The interception is subject to NEv. REv. STAT. §200.620(3) requiring
ratification by a supreme court judge or a district court judge within 72 hours of the interception.
Ratification is possible only when (I) an emergency situation exists and it is impractical to obtain
a court order, and (2) except for the absence of a court order, the interception meets the require-
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viding services and facilities for wire communications where the interception is made in order to maintain or operate the facilities of the
person being intercepted. 6 -.kaw enforcement and fire fighting agencies
are also free to monitor wire communications for emergency calls requesting aid from these agencies. 7 Furthermore, wire communications
initiated by these agencies while responding to an original call may be
recorded if the other party to the conversation is informed of the
monitoring. 8
Chapter 287 expands existing law9 by permitting the monitoring of
telephone calls made by prison inmates from within an institution to
persons outside the institution. 10 The interception, however, must be
made by an authorized employee of the Department of Prisons 11 and
signs must be posted near all institution telephones to notify the prisoners that their communications are subject to interception. 12 In addition,
Chapter 287 requires that both the inmate and the person receiving the
inmate's telephone call be notified that the conversation is being
intercepted. 13
Chapter 287 also requires the Director of Prisons 14 to adopt regulations providing alternative methods of communication for confidential
mattersY A communication is confidential if made to (1) a federal or
state officer, 16 (2) a local officer responsible for the custody of the offender,17 (3) an officer ofthe court, 18 (4) an attorney, 19 (5) a media employee,20 (6) the Director of Prisons, 21 or (7) an employee of the
Department of Prisons designated by the director. 22
ments of NEv. REv. STAT. §§179.410-.515. Should ratification be denied the applicant may not
use the information intercepted and must notify the conversants that their communicati..m was
intercepted. /d.
6. /d. §200.620(2) (e.g., public utility). Public utilities intercepting telephone conversations
made by offenders have a complete defense if they rely in good faith on an order from the director
or an authorized representative of the department. 1983 Nev. Stat. c. 287, §2(5), at 682.
7. NEV. REV. STAT. §200.620(4).
8. /d.
9. Compare id. §200.620 (amended by 1983 Nev. Stat. c. 287, §§!, 2, at 681-82) with 1975
Nev. Stat. c. 471, §1, at 747 (amending NEv. REv. STAT. §200.620).
10. 1983 Nev. Stat. c. 287, §2(1)(2), at 682.
II. /d. c. 287, §2(l)(a), at 682.
12. /d. c. 287, §2(l)(b), at 682.
13. /d. c. 287, §2(2), at 682 (periodic sound heard over the telephone is deemed adequate
notice).
14. NEv. REv. STAT. §209.061 (definition ofdirector);seeid. §209.131 (general duties of the
director).
·
15. 1983 Nev. Stat. c. 287, §2(3), at 682.
16. /d. c. 287, §2(4)(a), at 682.
17. /d. c. 287, §2(4)(b), at 682.
18. /d. c. 287, §2(4)(c), at 682.
19. /d. c. 287, §2(4)(d), at 682.
20. /d. c. 287, §2(4)(e), at 682.
21. Id. c. 287, §2(4)(f), at 682.
22. /d. c. 287, §2(4)(g), at 682.
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Comment

Monitoring communications for the purpose of maintaining security23 in a prison appears to be a reasonabl~trusion upon an inmate's
fourth amendment rights when balanced against legitimate governmental interests. 24 In two areas, however, Chapter 287 may violate
fourth amendment rights. First, Chapter 287 does not establish boundaries limiting the scope of "administrative" 25 monitoring 26 and, therefore, the intrusion in some areas may not be reasonable. 27 Although
monitoring to maintain prison security may be recognized as reasonable, it is unclear whether unlimited monitoring for any security purpose will be recognized as reasonable 28 . Secondly, the scope of
confidentiality in Chapter 287 may be too narrow 29 by not providing
for additional confidential relationships. 30 The need to monitor, therefore, may not outweigh the nature of the intrusion into these normally
23. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1973). The governmental interest in the administration of prisons includes the preservation of internal order and discipline, the maintenance of
institutional security against escapes or unauthorized entries, and the rehabilitation of prisoners.
/d. at 412; see also Giannelli and Gilligan, Prison Searches and Seizures: "Locking" The Fourth
Amendment Out of Correctional Facilities, 62 VA. L. REv. 1045, 1071 (1976) (protecting guards and
inmates from assaults, controlling contraband, and preventing escapes are legitimate security interests that may affect fourth amendment rights).
24. 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE fOURTH AMENDMENT 420-21
(1978); see State v. Ryan, 367 A.2d 920, 922-23 (articulation of the special governmental interest
making the monitoring system reasonable).
25. Giannelli, supra note 23, at 1077-78. Administrative searches are based on institutional
needs such as security interests associated with administering prisons as contrasted with law enforcement searches that are directed at solving a particular crime. /d. See Camara v. Municipal
Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) (where traditional probable cause standards would thwart legitimate governmental interests courts adopt a more flexible approach to accomodate these interests).
See generally 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 24, at 420-21 (monitoring not directed at particular
individuals).
26. 1983 Nev. Stat. c. 287, §2, at 682 (allowing monitoring but not limiting interception to
designated security interests). See generally 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 24, at 420-21 (suggesting
that monitoring should be allowed only to the extent that special security interests are implicated).
27. See generally Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 536-38 (1967) (balancing the need
to search against the nature of the intrusion); Giannelli, supra note 23, at 1071-89. A danger is
that "administrative searches" under the cloak of "prison security" will be used as a subterfuge for
law enforcement searches. /d. at 1071, 1083.
28. See 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 24, at 418. The courts must assess whether the monitoring
of conversations is a reasonable step in the interest of maintaining security in jails and prisons. If
this assessment is made, the conclusion that unlimited eavesdropping is needed is questionable.
/d. See generally Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F.Supp. 776, 791 (D.R.l. 1970) (suggesting that
experience has more clearly demonstrated that eavesdropping is not essential to the maintenance
of security).
29. Compare 1983 Nev. Stat. c. 287, §2(4)(a)-(g), at 682 (all conversations subject to monitoring except those expressly designated as confidential) with CAL. ADMIN. CoDE tit. 15, §3282(e)(f)(l983) (allowing inmates to make confidential calls to any other person when authorized by
designated staff).
30. See, e.g., NEv.- RE:v. STAT. §§49.015-.405 (recognizing accountant-client, doctor-patient,
priest-penitent, and husband-wife as privileged communications). See generally Giannelli and
Gilligan, supra note 23, at 1075. The need for prison security will in most instances diminish the
inmate's protection under traditional fourth amendment analysis; however, in some circumstances
the inmate may deserve more protection. /d.
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privileged communications. 31
Although the prohibition against the unauthorized interception of
"any wire or oral communication" found within Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196832 appears to apply to 33
and preempt all state legislation in the field of wiretapping and electronic surveillance, 34 some courts have held that prison officials are
outside the scope of this Act. 35 This recent trend permits prison officials to monitor inmate calls if done for a clearly legitimate purpose36
and with notice to the conversants. 37 If this trend prevails, Chapter 287
will not violate the provisions of Title III. 38
31. See generally Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) (balancing private
and governmental interests in determining the reasonableness of the intrusion); Gianelli and Gilligan, supra note 23, at 1088. Not all conversations by inmates need to be monitored to adequately
maintain security. A mea.nS of distinguishing between allowable and non-allowable electronic
surveillance must be found. /d. See 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 24, at 418 (citing Giannelli supra
note 23).
32. 18 U.S.C. §§2510-2520 (1968).
33. See U.S. v. Paul, 614 F.2d 115, 116 n.2 (6th cir. 1980); Campiti v. Walonis, 453 F.Supp.
819, 823 (D. Mass. 1980), a.ffd, 611 F.2d 387 (1st cir. 1979); Crooker v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 97
F.Supp. 500, 502 (D. Conn. 1980) (squarely rejecting the argument that Title III does not apply to
prison monitoring); see also S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 67-69 (1968) (congressional
mtent and relevant history).
· 34. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1968). Congress has broad powers to preempt
in areas arising under the Bill of Rights and due process clause of the 14th amendment.
Katzenback v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 647-51 (1966) and the commerce clause are authority. /d.
See also Halpin v. Superior Ct., 6 Cal. 3d 885, 899 (1972), 101 Cal. Rptr. 375, 385, 495 P.2d 1295,
!305 (upholding the constitutionality of Title III in superseding state rights by use of the commerce clause).
35. Compare Jandak v. Village of Brookfield, 520 F.Supp. 815, 821-25 (D. Ill. 1981) (careful
analysis of 18 U.S.C. §25!0(5)(a)(ii) allowing telephone equipment being used by investigative or
law enforcement officers in their ordinary course of duties to be exempt from Title III and its
application of prison monitoring); Adams v. State, 406 A.2d 637, 644-45 (1979), affd, 289 Md. 221,
424 A.2d 344 (1981); Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., Inc., 630 F.2d 414, 418-20 (5th cir. 1980)
with People v. Tebo, 194 N.W. 2d 517, 521-22 (1971); U.S. v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346, 351 (lOth cir.
1974) (law enforcement officers act in their ordinary course of duty only when the electronic interception is authorized).
36. See Jandak v. Village of Brookfield, 520 F.Supp. 815, 824 (D. Ill. 1981). Monitoring to
assure that phones were not misused for private purposes or in violation of established regulations
has been considered properly within the ordinary course of law enforcement duties. /d. (for Title
III purposes).
37. /d. at 823-24 (noting that courts have found violations of Title III where monitoring was
done without notice or for illicit purposes); id. at 824, fn. 7 (comparing decisions that have decided
what interceptions are within the ordinary course of law enforcement duty and what interceptions
are not).
38. See generally 1983 Nev. Stat. c. 287, §§2(l)(b), 2(2), at 682 (providing inmates with notice
of interception). Cf Supra note 35, 37 (violation of Title III is theoretically possible if the Tenth
Circuit is followed or if the monitoring is done for illicit purposes).
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